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Abstract
Different social contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This
could be problematic as contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement pro-
cess. We use a within-subjects design and measure distributional preferences in resource allo-
cation tasks with role certainty, role uncertainty, decomposed games, and matrix games. Re-
sults show that, at the aggregate level, role uncertainty and decomposed games lead to higher
degrees of prosociality when compared to role certainty. At the individual level, we observe
considerable differences in behavior across the social contexts, indicating that the majority of
people are sensitive to these different social settings but respond in different ways.
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1 Introduction: Measuring distributional preferences
The measurement of distributional preferences is an important issue in economics and psychology
(see e.g., Camerer and Fehr, 2004; Fisman et al, 2007; Balliet et al, 2009; Murphy and Ackermann,
2014; Kerschbamer, 2015a), but different measurement methods are used. Each method has two
distinct components. First, there are choice sets: well-defined sets of options that correspond
to different allocations. The second component is the social context in which a decision maker
(DM) makes her choices. Typically, social features of the decision task are minimized, but there
remains some minimal social context, as there must be some “other” who is affected by the choices
of the DM. Social contexts differ by role assignment and can be accentuated by the display of
information.
The design of our experiment is similar to Blanco et al (2011) and Dariel and Nikiforakis
(2014). Both use a within-subject design to compare behavior across different games. Instead
of comparing behavior across games, we compare subjects’ social value orientation (SVO) across
different social contexts, broadly considered. Differences in social context are potentially problem-
atic, as they may interact with other social preferences apart from pure distributional preferences,
for instance, preferences for reciprocity (Kerschbamer, 2015b). At the aggregate level, we com-
pare the average degree of prosociality and, at the individual level, we compare the consistency of
subjects’ revealed preferences.
2 Procedural differences
2.1 Different sets of stimuli and the slider measure
The first component for the measurement of distributional preferences is a resource allocation task.
The simplest task of this kind is a dictator game. Other measurements of distributional preferences
are based on multiple resource allocation tasks that have a more nuanced structure (e.g., various
marginal rates of substitution, see Murphy and Ackermann, 2014, and Kerschbamer, 2013, for
surveys comparing different methods). In each task the DM chooses her most preferred option,
and, based on her choices, her distributional preferences are revealed.
In this study, we use the SVO Slider Measure which has demonstrable psychometric benefits
over alternative measures, including its production of a continuous score and a built-in transitivity
check. SVO has been shown to be highly stable as an individual difference with a test-retest
reliability of r = 0.915 (Murphy et al, 2011).
The Slider Measure consists of six resource allocation tasks (see Figure 5 in the Appendix and
Murphy et al, 2011). Based on the DM’s choices, her SVO is computed as
SV O◦ = arctan
(
p¯io − 50
p¯is − 50
)
, (1)
where p¯is and p¯io denote the DM’s and the other’s mean payoff. The SVO angle can range between
-16.26◦ and 61.39◦, while negative angular degrees indicate negative concerns for others, angular
degrees close to zero indicate narrow self-interest, and positive angular degrees indicate positive
concerns for others.1
1Self-interest does not result in a score of exactly 0 because allocation task 1 is structured such that the DM’s
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2.2 Different social contexts
One way to conceptualize a resource allocation task is to consider a decision situation with two
distinct roles, an active Decider and a passive Receiver. The Decider chooses an allocation which
determines her own and the Receiver’s payoff. This is not a proper game as only the Decider
makes a choice. However, it is a social decision as the Decider’s choice has an effect on some
other person.
There has been substantial contextual heterogeneity in how resource allocation tasks have been
implemented. This heterogeneity stems from differences in role assignment, on which we elaborate
next.
2.2.1 Role certainty
With fixed role assignment or role certainty, subject A is in the role of the Decider and subject B
is in the role of the Receiver. B is passive, A knows this, and all of these features are common
knowledge. In experimental practice, the sample is split in half and the role of the Decider is
assigned to subjects in one half, while the role of the Receiver is assigned to subjects in the other
half of the sample. Role certainty has been employed in several experiments (e.g., Forsythe et al,
1994; Dana et al, 2007; Bardsley, 2007).
A downside of this procedure is inefficiency in that the distributional preferences of only half of
the subjects are assessed. Another consequence is that this context creates a substantial imbalance
in power that is obvious to Decider and Receiver. This imbalance may evoke particular feelings of
responsibility or entitlement on behalf of some Deciders, whereas others may not be affected by
this imbalance.
2.2.2 Role uncertainty
A procedure that avoids the inefficiency of only measuring half the sample is role uncertainty. All
subjects perform the resource allocation task but do not know a priori whether they are going to
be assigned the role of Decider or Receiver. Only after decisions are made, subjects are matched
randomly in pairs and another random process determines which role is assigned to which sub-
ject in each pair. Role uncertainty has been employed in several experiments (e.g., Charness and
Grosskopf, 2001; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004).
Role uncertainty also mitigates the issue of power imbalance and preserves symmetry. With
role uncertainty, all subjects are equally entitled because all subjects perform the same task (En-
gelmann and Strobel, 2004, 859).
2.2.3 Double role assignment
With double role assignment, all subjects simultaneously perform the resource allocation task. A
subject’s total payoff comes from two sources: the payoff from her role as Decider, and her payoff
from her role as Receiver. The mapping from choices to payoffs is common knowledge, and,
because the two subjects are interdependent, this is a strategic setting. Double role assignment with
random pairs is used in many economic experiments (e.g., Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fisman et al,
payoff is invariant at 85 and the DM chooses a payoff for the other ranging between 15 and 85.
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2007; Balafoutas et al, 2012, 2014). Double role assignment with fixed pairs has been employed
in several experiments, mostly in psychology where it is most frequently used in the measurement
of SVO (e.g., Pruitt, 1967; Messick and McClintock, 1968; Liebrand, 1984; Offerman et al, 1996;
van Lange et al, 2007).
Each subject simultaneously gives and receives, so that a subject’s decision to give might de-
pend on her expectations about what she will receive from the other. Measuring distributional
preferences with double role assignment may yield a confound as expectations may inform choices
as well as preferences. Along these lines Rigdon and Levine (2009) find significant differences in
choice behavior contingent upon subjects’ expectations.
Given double role assignment, there are two ways of displaying information. If information is
displayed in a payoff matrix, strategic interdependence is salient because a subject can see clearly
that there is another subject whose decision affects their own payoff. Matrix games have not been
used to measure social preferences because of this obvious strategic interdependence.
One attempt to control for strategic interdependence are decomposed games, which manipulate
how information about payoffs is displayed (Pruitt, 1967; Messick and McClintock, 1968). As-
sume that A and B simultaneously choose between X = (100, 50) and Y = (85, 85). With the
decomposed games method each subject sees both allocations and is informed that the other sub-
ject chooses between the same allocations. The normal form representation and the corresponding
decomposed game can be seen in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Decomposed game and matrix game. In the matrix game subject A chooses a row and
subject B simultaneously chooses a column. In the decomposed game, both subjects simultane-
ously choose an allocation and the final payoffs are given by the sum of the allocations.
The use of decomposed games may be a misguided experimental manipulation as it does noth-
ing to really mitigate strategic interdependence (see also Greiff, 2013). Decomposed games are
still strategic games, but merely designed to be obtuse and thus harder for subjects to understand.
Obfuscation is not the same as experimental control, and experimenters may not be able to blur
away strategic interdependence.
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A charitable interpretation of the decomposed games approach is that it acts like choice fram-
ing, directing a subject’s attention to the consequences of her own action while downplaying the
potential consequences from the other’s choice (Pruitt, 1967).
3 Hypotheses
Before we derive the hypotheses we introduce the experimental design (see Figure 2), because
understanding the design helps make the hypotheses clearer. There are three different role assign-
ment procedures and one of the procedures has two ways of displaying information. This yields
four treatments: the Role Certainty Treatment (RCT), the Role Uncertainty Treatment (RUT), the
Decomposed Game Treatment (DGT), and the Matrix Game Treatment (MGT). We use a fully
within-subject design with random orderings of treatments to mitigate potential carryover effects.
Using this design, we test the following hypotheses.
individual decision making task strategic interaction (proper game)
treatment role certainty  treatment (RCT)
role uncertainty 
treatment (RUT)
decomposed game 
treatment (DGT)
matrix game  
treatment (MGT)
role 
assignment fixed role assignment role uncertainty double role assignment double role assignment
simplified 
stimulus 
example
interdepen-
dence 
structure
Options
A B
You receive 100 85
The other 
receives 50 85
Options
A B
You receive 100 85
The other 
receives 50 85
Options
A B
You receive 100 85
The other 
receives 50 85
The other’s options
A B
Your 
options
A 150, 150 185, 135
B 135, 185 170, 170
Subj. 1 Subj. 2 Subj. 1 Subj. 2
Chance
event
Subj. 1 Subj. 2Subj. 1 Subj. 2
Figure 2: Experimental design. The figures in the last row show how influence propagates from a
subject to affect her own payoff and the payoff of another subject.
H1: Incentives reduce distributional preferences.
In the RCT, half of the subjects filled out the Slider Measure with incentives knowing they were
the Deciders. The other half filled out the Slider Measure knowing they were the Receivers and
that their responses would not have any effect on themselves nor any other subject.
This implementation yields a test of the effect of incentives on distributional preferences. Sim-
ilar tests have been conducted before. Mentzakis and Mestelman (2013) found no significant ef-
fects, but in Forsythe et al (1994), subjects are found to be more generous if decisions are hypo-
thetical.
To see how financial incentives affect behavior, we compare SVO scores within the RCT, com-
paring subjects who made incentivized choices with subjects who made hypothetical choices. Al-
though previous findings are mixed, we expect that incentivized choices will decrease SVO.
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H2: Role certainty reduces distributional preferences relative to role uncertainty.
Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011) compare behavior in modified dictator games with role certainty
and role uncertainty and find that subjects are more generous with role uncertainty. This could be
driven by fairness considerations and/or by the cost of expressing generosity.
Fairness considerations could lead to more prosocial choices in the RUT. Assume that the
choice of an allocation that would result in a high payoff for the other subject is perceived as nice.
If A has a preference for fairness and expects B to choose the nice allocation, A might reciprocate
by also choosing the nice allocation (Rabin, 1993). Here, A’s choice depends on her expectation
about B’s intention.
Higher generosity with role uncertainty could be due to the low costs of expressing generosity
(see also the literature on low cost expressive voting, e.g., Kirchgässner, 1992; Hillman, 2010).
Assume that being generous increases utility because subjects derive utility from expressing their
generosity (Hillman, 2010). With role certainty, the additional utility from being generous comes
with a reduction in own payoff. With role uncertainty, being generous in the role of Decider
reduces the expected payoff; the actual payoff is reduced only if the subject is assigned to the role
of Decider. Hence, the expected price of expressing generosity is lower in RUT. Due to fairness
considerations and the low costs of expressing generosity, we expect subjects to be more generous
with role uncertainty.
H3: Strategic interdependence increases distributional preferences.
Shafir and Tversky (1992) report results of an experiment where 25% of choices from subjects
playing sequential and simultaneous prisoner’s dilemmas had the following pattern: Subjects chose
to defect when they knew the other subject had chosen to defect, they chose to defect when they
knew the other subject had chosen to cooperate, yet they chose to cooperate when they did not
know the other subject’s choice. A possible explanation is that in simultaneous games, subjects
cooperate because they are motivated to maximize the sum of payoffs (Shafir and Tversky, 1992,
457). In the sequential prisoner’s dilemma, the second mover has control over both outcomes once
the first mover has made her choice. This undermines team reasoning and subjects tend to choose
the alternative that maximizes their own payoffs (Shafir and Tversky, 1992, 457).
A similar kind of team reasoning could be at work in DGT and MGT. If this is the case, subjects
would choose prosocial allocations in treatments DGT and MGT, compared to the treatments RCT
and RUT.
H4: Decomposed games increase distributional preferences relative to matrix games.
Previous empirical results show that behavior in decomposed games and strategically equiv-
alent matrix games are different (Pruitt, 1967; Gallo Jr. et al, 1969). For most decompositions,
cooperation rates where higher. Analogously, we expect that SVO will be higher in DGT.
H5: Behavior in decomposed games is more similar to behavior in matrix games than to
behavior in resource allocation tasks with role certainty.
Our four treatments correspond to four different measurement methods. The correlations
among the methods can be treated as a method similarity matrix, which itself can be the basis
for further analysis using classical multi-dimensional scaling. This kind of analysis provides ev-
idence into the “distance” among the different methods. Moreover, if the different methods were
inconsequential to behavior (i.e., if they all measure the same thing), then the correlations between
the treatments would be very high and approximate test-retest correlation levels.
In contrast to hypotheses 1 to 4, this hypothesis is concerned with the consistency of individual
behavior. This analysis is useful in that it is sensitive to heterogeneity in responses. Say for
6
example that half of the subjects became more prosocial in a particular treatment and half become
less prosocial in the same treatment (compared to a baseline treatment). This result would yield a
consistent mean level of prosociality, but it would not indicate that overall subjects were behaving
consistently.
4 Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 192 subjects partic-
ipated. The order in which subjects encountered the four treatments was fully counterbalanced
across sessions with eight subjects per session.2
In each treatment subjects are matched pairwise and all subjects decide in six different decision
situations. In RCT, RUT and DGT the six situations correspond to the six resource allocation tasks
which comprise the items of the SVO Slider Measure (Figure 5). In MGT the six decision situations
correspond to six matrix games. Hence, we can compute a subject’s SVO for each treatment. Role-
assignment is treatment specific, as described in Figure 2.
5 Results
Each of the 192 subjects participated in all four treatments. In RCT only half of decisions were
incentivized. If not explicitly stated otherwise, only incentivized decisions are used for statistical
analysis.
5.1 Descriptive analysis
The observed preference distributions are consistent with data from earlier experiments in which
SVO was measured (Murphy et al, 2011). In all treatments the most common SVO score is 7.82,
corresponding to the maximization of the own payoff. Table 1 summarizes the data on subjects’
SVOs. The first four columns contain the descriptive statistics for incentivized choices. In RCT
half of the subjects made hypothetical decisions which are summarized in column 6. Pooled ob-
servations from RCT are summarized in column 5.
RCT(inc.) RUT DGT MGT RCT(all) RCT(hyp.)
n 96 192 192 192 192 96
Mean 16.46 17.98 17.30 18.83 17.98 19.51
Median 11.36 16.26 14.94 16.26 14.62 16.73
Std 13.06 14.40 13.97 16.92 14.74 16.18
Table 1: Descriptive analysis on subjects’ SVOs.
The scatterplots (Figure 3) and the corresponding rank correlations reveal that there is substan-
tial heterogeneity at the individual level. Each scatterplot compares two treatments and reports
2For details about the experimental procedure, see Section A in the Appendix.
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the corresponding correlation. We see that for all pairwise comparisons, there are data points
both above and below the 45-degree line. This indicates changes in distributional preferences at
the individual level. There are only 16 out of 192 subjects for whom SVOs were identical in all
treatments.3 For a total of 37 subjects, SVOs do not differ by more than 5◦ between treatments.
5.2 Hypotheses tests
Result 1: In RCT there is no significant difference between incentivized and hypothetical decisions
(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.140).4
Although we do not find a difference in generosity, financial incentives significantly reduce
variance (Levene test, p = 0.004). If incentivized decisions have less variance because subjects
are less likely to respond haphazardly, incentives may be an effective way to reduce noise.
Result 2: On average, we find that subjects in RUT are more prosocial than in RCT (t-test,
p = 0.029).
Our experiment cannot tell whether this result is driven by fairness considerations or by the
cost of expressing generosity. However, if SVO is measured with role uncertainty, a subject’s SVO
should be considered as an upper bound.
Result 3: SVO does not differ significantly between treatments (RCT,RUT) and (DGT,MGT).
To test for this effect, we computed each subject’s average SVO from treatments (RCT,RUT)
and (DGT,MGT). Call these averages SV O(nonstr.) and SV O(str.). The averages are SV O(nonstr.) =
17.97 and SV O(str.) = 19.80. A signed rank test shows that the median of differences is not sig-
nificantly different from zero (p = 0.080).
Result 4: On average, SVO is not significantly different between DGT and MGT (signed rank
test, p = 0.295).
At the aggregate level, there is no difference in SVO. At the individual level, however, the
correlation between both treatments is only 0.409, and the variance is significantly higher in MGT
(Levene test, p = 0.001). This implies that the majority of subjects are sensitive to the strategic
framing, but respond in different ways.
Possibly, the decomposed games framing sufficiently “hides” the other subject so that strategic
considerations are less salient in DGT, while the payoff matrix increases the salience of the strategic
considerations. With strategic considerations being more salient, choice behavior could be driven
by expectations, and individual differences in expectations, which are amplified by the salience of
interdependence, can explain the larger variance in MGT.
Result 5: Behavior in decomposed games is closer to resource allocation tasks with role cer-
tainty than to matrix games.
This result is consistent with both a inspection of the difference matrix in Table 2 and mul-
tidimensional results (explained below). RCT and MGT produce the largest difference between
methods (0.741), and DGT and RUT produce the smallest difference (0.466). All of these differ-
ences are more that would be expected from chance alone. The test-retest reliability of the SVO
Slider Measure is reported as 0.915 (Murphy et al, 2011), implying an expected difference of about
3For 9 subjects, who made hypothetical decisions in RCT, SVOs were exactly the same in RUT, DGT and MGT;
for 7 subjects, who made incentivized decisions in RCT, SVOs were exactly the same in all four treatments.
4To check the robustness of results 1 to 4 we performed (bootstrapped) t-tests and excluded subjects who violated
transitivity. The results are the same.
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Figure 3: SVO scatterplots and Spearman’s rank correlations (r). Horizontal and vertical lines
represent mean values of the corresponding treatment. (Some mean values differ from the mean
values in Table 1 because in this figure, mean values are computed over all subjects who made
incentivized decisions in both treatments, the treatment on the x-axis and the treatment on the
y-axis.)
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0.085 (95% CI 0.065 to 0.111) due to measurement error alone. The observed differences are sub-
stantially larger than this, indicating significant effects of social context on the measurement of
distributive preferences at the individual level.
RCT RUT DGT MGT
RCT 0 - - -
RUT 0.484 0 - -
DGT 0.544 0.466 0 -
MGT 0.741 0.586 0.591 0
Table 2: Difference matrix among the different treatments. The entries are 1 minus the correlation
between two methods. Higher numbers indicate more inconsistency in subject’s behavior between
two methods.
Results from multidimensional scaling yield the rank ordering of methods in terms of similar-
ity. The resulting ordering is: RCT, RUT, DGT, and MGT. The output scores are -0.4404, -0.1296,
-0.0434, 0.6135 respectively. The stress of the model is (1.65e-16) indicating adequacy of the
goodness of fit of the unidimensional model. These multidimensional scaling scores can be nor-
malized between 0 and 1 (see Figure 4), and the results show that behavior in DGT is closer to
behavior in RCT than to MGT.
RCT RUT DGT MGT
0 0.29 0.38 1
Figure 4: Normalized multidimensional scaling scores from each of the four treatments mapped
onto a unidimensional solution. This analysis yields the relative similarity (behavioral consistency)
among the different treatments.
Note that the large differences in scores between DGT and MGT is not inconsistent with Result
4. The central tendency of the DGT and MGT distributions are similar but that does not imply that
individual behavior in the treatments is consistan. Rather we see that many DMs respond to the
strategic framing, but in different ways.
5.3 Implications for the measurement of distributional preferences
In resource allocation tasks with role certainty strategic considerations are absent because the other
subject affected by the DM’s behavior is completely passive. Kerschbamer (2015b) argues that role
certainty “seems to be the cleanest procedure from a theoretical point of view” (p. 1). We agree
with this viewpoint and the results from RCT provide the most straightforward evidence about
subject’s distributive preferences.
We show evidence that different subjects respond differently as role uncertainty and strategic
interdependence is introduced. This increased social interdependence may be of interest, but it
creates complexity and creates multiple confounding factors (different behavioral forces triggered
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by social context) which make valid interpretations about revealed distributional preferences dif-
ficult. Because of this, our conclusions echo Kerschbamer who advocates measuring distributive
preferences with role certainty.
We find no significant differences in average SVO given incentives. Nonetheless, we do not
agree with Mentzakis and Mestelman (2013) who argue that eliciting SVO without financial incen-
tives comes with no disadvantages. The difference in means, although not statistically significant,
points to the presence of other factors, which may inflate SVO if no incentives are used. Moreover,
hypothetical decisions inflate variance and reduce statistical power (see also Camerer and Hogarth,
1999).
When SVO is measured with role uncertainty, the resulting score should be taken as an upper
bound to an individuals’ distributional preferences. Role uncertainty is clearly a more efficient
measurement method but it comes with trade-offs. Experimenters should weigh the benefits of the
efficiency advantage with the possibility of inflating scores due to role uncertainty. Luckily for
the efficiency-minded researcher the effect is not massive, and for work that only requires a rough
approximation of distributive preferences the RUT approach may be sufficient.
This study is silent to which of these social contexts provides the best way to measure SVO.
In order to establish evidence to address this question, one would have to measure SVO using a
variety of different social contexts and then use these different individual scores to predict other be-
havior (predictive validity), correlate the scores on other measures (convergent validity), and show
how the scores were separate from other constructs like beliefs (divergent validity). Ironically, a
confounded measure of SVO (simultaneously measuring both preferences and beliefs) may make
better predictions of cooperative choices rather than a pure measure of distributional preferences
alone, as beliefs are also a good predictor of cooperative behavior. It is for this reason that one
would have to measure beliefs in tandem with preferences, in order to establish the unique predic-
tive capacity of SVO for cooperative behaviors. All of this is beyond the scope of the current paper,
which had the modest goal of identifying to what degree, if at all, social contexts affect subject’s
SVO scores.
6 Conclusion
This article contributes to the literature on procedural differences and their effects on prosocial
behavior. We systematically studied the effect of three different methods to measure SVO (RCT,
RUT, DGT), and included an obvious strategic choice (MGT) setting. Although laboratory ex-
periments offer a relatively clean environment, there remains at least some minimal social context
in which the choices are embedded, as there is some “other” whose payoff is influenced by the
choices of the DM. The role assignments create part of the social context, and we investigated how
social context and its salience influences behavior. Overall results show that in the aggregate, dis-
tributional preferences are higher when assessed under role uncertainty or in decomposed games,
compared to role certainty. Importantly, at the individual level, there are substantial non-systematic
differences between treatments.
The comparison of decomposed games and matrix games adds to the literature on presenta-
tion effects (Charness et al, 2004; Requate and Waichman, 2010; Gürerk and Selten, 2011). The
comparison of role assignment procedures also complements the studies by Murphy et al (2011)
and Kerschbamer (2015a), which discuss how to identify distributional preferences based on sub-
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jects’ choices in several resource allocation tasks but do not discuss the issue of role assignment.
A better understanding of the influence of social context on behavior is desirable because it leads
to a cleaner measurement of distributional preferences. From the perspective of a practitioner,
who would like to control for subjects’ preferences, a more precise measurement allows for better
mitigation, which helps make predictions more effectively.
The overall pattern of results leads us to the following conclusions: Different people have
distributional preferences to different degrees. We know from previous research that these pref-
erences are relatively stable in the absence of information (i.e., in a test-retest sense). What we
identify here is that these distributional preferences are sensitive to social contexts and increasing
the social interdependence, and its salience, causes different people to respond in fundamentally
different ways– some people become nicer, some become more selfish. We conjecture that the het-
erogeneity in responses to different social contexts is driven in large part by heterogeneous beliefs
about what others are like. DMs homegrown preferences are made more salient by different social
contexts, and the result is that DM’s distributional preferences, as measured by the SVO Slider
Measure, change in different ways as function of these beliefs.
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Appendix
A Detailed experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted at the University of Giessen using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). A
total of 192 subjects participated. Upon arrival, subjects were asked to take a seat at a randomly
assigned computer workstation where they found general instructions which informed subjects that
the experiment consists of four independent treatments. In addition to the general instructions, each
subject found four sealed and differently colored envelopes on her desk, containing the instructions
for the four different treatments.
Subjects were informed that at the beginning of each part, the on-screen instructions would
inform them which colored envelope to open. This procedure ensures that subjects are informed
about each treatment only when the treatment begins, but that the treatments exist a priori and are
independent of their choices.
In order to avoid that subjects act prosocially in order to elicit kindness from reciprocators in
subsequent tasks or treatments, subjects received feedback about results and earnings only at the
very end of the experiment.
The order in which subjects encountered the four treatments was fully counterbalanced across
sessions. That is, we implemented all permutations of the orders of treatments, resulting in 4! = 24
orders that were each implemented in a separate session. The number of subjects per session was
eight, and a no-contagion matching, which was also explained to subjects, was used (Kamecke,
1997).
At the beginning of each treatment, subjects opened the envelope containing the treatment-
specific instructions which were also read aloud by the experimenter, and subjects had the oppor-
tunity to ask questions privately. Before starting the experimental task subjects had to answer a
control question correctly to verify their comprehension.
Each treatment consists of six different decision situations. In treatments RCT, RUT and DGT
the six decision situations correspond to the six resource allocation tasks which comprise the six
primary items of the SVO Slider Measure (see Figure 5). In treatment MGT the six decision
situations correspond to six matrix games (see appendix C for all matrix games).5
Within each treatment, task order and option order of the six resource allocation tasks was fully
randomized. These randomization procedures were implemented to control for order effects both
within and across treatments, and moreover, to mitigate carryover effects from subjects remem-
bering their previous choices in particular items and simply attempting to reproduce their former
choice patterns rather than reflecting anew on their preferences in each task and treatment.
Subjects were informed that each subject’s final payoff was given by the sum of each treat-
ment’s payoff plus a fixed show-up fee (5 euros). For each treatment, one of the six decision
5The resource allocation tasks were implemented in terms of zTree modules (Crosetto et al, 2012) that were slightly
modified so that items consists of five options per task rather than nine options. We provide subjects with five options
per task to ensure that the recomposition of the corresponding decomposed games into matrix games in normal form
would not overwhelm subjects with too many strategies. In the most commonly used version, each item from the
Slider Measure corresponds to the choice between nine alternatives. Recomposing these Slider Measure items would
have resulted in a 9 x 9 payoff matrix with 81 cells. Reducing to 5 options yielded a matrix game that had only 25
cells which we considered experimentally tractable.
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100
50
88 75 63 50
63 75 88 100
You receive
Other receives
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50
96 93 89 85
59 68 76 85
You receive
Other receives
Figure 5: The six resource allocation tasks from the SVO Slider Measure.
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situations from each treatment was randomly selected, and the decisions made by both members
in that decision situation determined payoffs from this treatment.
The experiment lasted 60 minutes and the average payment, including the show-up fee, was
14.55 Euros.
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B Experimental Instructions
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation. Please read the instructions
carefully. Do not talk to your neighbors during the entire experiment. If you have any questions
please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come to you and answer your questions in
private. Following these rules is very important. Otherwise the results of this experiment will be
scientifically worthless.
Please take your time reading the instructions and making your decisions. You are not able to
influence the duration of the experiment by rushing through your decisions, because you always
have to wait until the remaining participants have reached their decisions.
The experiment is completely anonymous. Neither during nor after the experiment you will be
informed with whom you have interacted. No other participant will be informed about which role
you were assigned to and how much you have earned. You will receive a show-up fee of 5 euros
for your participation. Depending on your decisions and the decisions of the other participants you
can additionally earn between 4 and 12 euros. You will be paid individually, privately, and in cash
after the experiment. The expected duration of the experiment is 60 minutes. The exact course of
the experiment will be described in the following.
The experiment consists of four parts which are independent from each other. Each part con-
sists of six decision situations. The beginning of a new part of the experiment will be indicated on
the screen. The instructions for each part of the experiment are in the colored envelopes. Please
open the envelope with the relevant information only if the corresponding part of the experiment
begins.
In each round, participants will be randomly matched in pairs, but you will never interact with
the same participant twice. In other words, you can be sure that you will never interact with the
same participant in several parts of the experiment. Furthermore, the matchings are done in such
a way that the actions you take in one round cannot affect the actions of the people you will be
paired with in later rounds. This also means that the actions of the participants you are paired with
in a given round cannot be affected by your actions in earlier rounds. During the experiment, you
will not receive any information about the decisions of the other participants, and other participants
will not receive information about your decisions. During the experiment, the payoffs are denoted
in points. The exchange rate between points and Euros is 1/50. In other words, for 50 points you
receive 1 Euro.
Calculation of your final payoff: After the experiment, a decision situation is randomly selected
from each part of the experiment. Each decision situation has the same probability for being
selected. That is, in every part each decision situation could be the decision situation, which
determined your payoff from this part. Therefore, it makes sense to treat each decision situation as
if it is the payoff-relevant decision situation.
The payoff that you get in addition to the 5 euros is the sum of the payoffs in the randomly
selected decision situations. At the end of the experiment, you will be informed about the four ran-
domly selected decision situations, the corresponding payoffs, and the sum of the payoffs. There
will be a brief questionnaire after the last round is completed. After completion of the question-
naire, you will receive your payoff in cash. Payoffs will be made in private so that other participants
won’t be informed about your payoff.
The experiment will begin shortly. If you have any questions please raise your hand and wait
until someone comes to your place. Please do not talk to the other participants during the entire
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experiment. Thank you for participating.
Part “Red”
In this part of the experiment, there are two roles, Decider, and Receiver, who will be randomly
chosen. At the beginning, you will be informed about your role. In each of the six decision
situation, the Decider chooses her most preferred allocation. That is, the decisions of the Decider
determines her own payoff and the payoff of the Receiver. The Receiver has no influence on her
own payoff and the payoff of the Decider. The Receiver chooses the allocation, that she would
have chosen if she were in the role of the Decider. That is, that the decisions of the Receiver are
purely hypothetical.
Your payoff from this part is calculated as follows: At the end of this part, a decision situation
is randomly drawn and the allocation chosen by the Decider determines Decider’s and Receiver’s
payoffs. You will be informed about the chosen decision situation and the corresponding payoffs
at the end of the experiment.
Part “Blue”
In this part of the experiment, there will be six decisions. In each decision, you choose your
most preferred allocation. The other participant faces the same decisions and has exactly same
information as you. When you and the other participant have taken all decisions, it will randomly
be determined whether payoffs are determined by your or the other participants’ decisions.
Your payoff from this part is calculated as follows: At the end of this part, a decision situation
is randomly drawn. In addition, a fair coin toss determines whether payoffs are determined by your
or the other participants’ decisions. You will be informed about the chosen decision situation and
the corresponding payoffs at the end of the experiment.
Part “Green”
In this part of the experiment, there will be six decisions. In each decision, you choose your
most preferred allocation. The other participant faces the same decisions and has exactly same
information as you. The payoffs depend of your decisions and on the other participant’s decision.
Your payoff from this part is calculated as follows: At the end of this part, a decision situa-
tion is randomly drawn. Your payoff is given by the amount you have allocated to yourself, and
the amount that the other participant has allocated to you. The payoff of the other participant is
given by the amount the other participant has allocated to herself, and the amount that you have
allocated to the other participant. You will be informed about the chosen decision situation and the
corresponding payoffs at the end of the experiment.
Part “Yellow”
In this part of the experiment, you interact with another participant in six decision situations.
In each decision situation, both participants have to make a decision. That is, each participant
chooses the option she prefers. The payoffs that are associated with each combination of decisions
are displayed in the payoff table.
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In the row header there are the options that you can choose. In the column header there are
the options that can be chosen by the other participant. The payoffs associated with a particular
combination of choices are in the cell, in which the chosen row and column intersect. The entry
to the left of the vertical bar within a cell is your payoff. The entry to the right of the vertical bar
within a cell is the other participant’s payoff.
Your payoff from this part is calculated as follows: A At the end of this part, a decision situation
is randomly drawn. Your payoff and the other participant’s payoff is determined by the options you
and the other participant selected in this decision situations. You will be informed about the chosen
decision situation and the corresponding payoffs at the end of the experiment.
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C The six matrix games used in MGT
The other’s options
Option A Option B Option C Option D Option E
Your options
Option A 170, 170 153, 170 135, 170 118, 170 100, 170
Option B 170, 153 153, 153 135, 153 118, 153 100, 153
Option C 170, 135 153, 135 135, 135 118, 135 100, 135
Option D 170, 118 153, 118 135, 118 118, 118 100, 118
Option E 170, 100 153, 100 135, 100 118, 100 100, 100
Table 3: Recomposition of task number one into a matrix game.
The other’s options
Option A Option B Option C Option D Option E
Your options
Option A 100, 100 109, 104 118, 108 126, 111 135, 115
Option B 104, 109 113, 113 122, 117 130, 120 139, 124
Option C 108, 118 117, 122 126, 126 134, 129 143, 133
Option D 111, 126 120, 130 129, 134 137, 137 146, 141
Option E 115, 135 124, 139 133, 143 141, 146 150, 150
Table 4: Recomposition of task number two into a matrix game.
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The other’s options
Option A Option B Option C Option D Option E
Your options
Option A 150, 150 146, 159 143, 168 139, 176 135, 185
Option B 159, 146 155, 155 152, 164 148, 172 144, 181
Option C 168, 143 164, 152 161, 161 157, 169 153, 178
Option D 176, 139 172, 148 169, 157 165, 165 161, 174
Option E 185, 135 181, 144 178, 153 174, 161 170, 170
Table 5: Recomposition of task number three into a matrix game.
The other’s options
Option A Option B Option C Option D Option E
Your options
Option A 150, 150 129, 159 108, 168 86, 176 65, 185
Option B 159, 129 138, 138 117, 147 95, 155 74, 164
Option C 168, 108 147, 117 126, 126 104, 134 83, 143
Option D 176, 86 155, 95 134, 104 112, 112 91, 121
Option E 185, 65 164, 74 143, 83 121, 91 100, 100
Table 6: Recomposition of task number four into a matrix game.
The other’s options
Option A Option B Option C Option D Option E
Your options
Option A 150, 150 163, 138 175, 125 188, 113 200, 100
Option B 138, 163 151, 151 163, 138 176, 126 188, 113
Option C 125, 175 138, 163 150, 150 163, 138 175, 125
Option D 113, 188 126, 176 138, 163 151, 151 163, 138
Option E 100, 200 113, 188 125, 175 138, 163 150, 150
Table 7: Recomposition of task number five into a matrix game.
The other’s options
Option A Option B Option C Option D Option E
Your options
Option A 150, 150 159, 146 168, 143 176, 139 185, 135
Option B 146, 159 155, 155 164, 152 172, 148 181, 144
Option C 143, 168 152, 164 161, 161 169, 157 178, 153
Option D 139, 176 148, 172 157, 169 165, 165 174, 161
Option E 135, 185 144, 181 153, 178 161, 174 170, 170
Table 8: Recomposition of task number six into a matrix game.
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Figure 6: SVO Histograms.
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E Tests for Order Effects
In general, there is no systematic relation between SVO angles and the order of when they were
assessed (r = −0.03 , p = 0.33).
First After uncertainty After direct After matrix
−20
−10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
n =48 n =48 n =48
n =48
SVO certainty depending on order of condition
First After certainty After direct After matrix
−20
−10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
n =48
n =48 n =48
n =48
SVO uncertainty depending on order of condition
First After certainty After uncertainty After matrix
−20
−10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
n =48 n =48
n =48 n =48
SVO direct depending on order of condition
First After certainty After uncertainty After direct
−20
−10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
n =48
n =48 n =48
n =48
SVO matrix depending on order of conditionSVO(MGT)SVO(DGT)
SVO(RUT)SVO(RCT)
First First
First First
after
RUT
after
RUT
after
RUT
after
DGT
after
DGT
after
DGT
after
MGT
after
MGT
after
MGT
after
RCT
after
RCT
after
RCT
Figure 7: Descriptives of SVO angles per treatment depending on which other treatment was
encountered before.
25
